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THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
I.

INTRODUCTION

Over the span of a century and a half many legal rules and concepts
evolve and unfold in response to variant social conditions and as a
means of restructuring social activity. Frequently a legal doctrine as
presently understood and applied bears little relation, and may even be
inapposite, to its germinal case. 1 The original contours of a legal concept
may, therefore, often be of small practical import in its current application.
This general thesis is not applicable, however, to the doctrine of sovereign
immunity - that principle which provides that a recognized foreign
sovereign is not susceptible, without its consent, to the judicial process
of the courts in any other state. Although more than one hundred and
fifty years old, the case vivifying this legal concept, The Schooner Ex3
change v. McFaddon,2 is still repeatedly referred to in judicial opinions.
Significantly, it is cited not for purposes of distinction or historical perspective, but rather, is employed as a present underpinning for the concept
of sovereign immunity, even though the political and social circumstances
of today differ considerably from those existing in 1812.
Subsequent cases, however, while often justifying the conclusions
reached by references to Marshall's discussion in The Schooner Exchange,
have intertwined into the concept of sovereign immunity notions distinct
from Chief Justice Marshall's rationale. Hence the present status of the
doctrine of sovereign immunity is not the end product of, or even a
stage in, the development of a freely evolving legal concept. Instead
4
it is an amalgam of several distinct notions.
As a prelude to a discussion of the concept of sovereign immunity
it will be helpful to initially sketch certain distinctions so that the concept's
historical development may be better understood. Two basic theories of
sovereign immunity have struggled for ascendency in the cases and in
the discourse of commentators. Traditionally, sovereign immunity has
been regarded as either absolute or restrictive. The former notion is the
simpler of the two. Under the absolute theory the sole inquiry is whether
or not the entity being sued is a foreign sovereign. If so, the court will
1. For a concise demonstration of this proposition in the instance of the development of the doctrine of the manufacturer's liability for defective products see E. LEvi,
AN INTRODUCTION To LEGAL REASONING 8-27 (1948) ; H. BERMAN & W. GREINER,
THE NATURE AND FUNCTIONS

oF LAW 400-72

(2d ed. 1966).

2. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).

3. Victory Transp. Inc. v. Comisaria Generale Abastecimiestos y Transportes,
336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965) ; Harris & Co. Advertizing v. Republic of Cuba, 127 So. 2d 687 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961) ; Chemical Natural
Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Venezuela, 420 Pa. 134, 215 A.2d 864 (1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 822 (1967).
4. See Collins, The Effectiveness of The Restrictive Theory of Sovereign Im-
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dismiss the action.5 The restrictive theory is a refinement of the absolute
theory. Not only must the defendant be a foreign sovereign, but the
sovereign must also be acting in its public capacity and not its private
capacity. 6 These two formulations represent the basic approaches to
delineating the substantive content of the doctrine.
It is also appropriate to note the fact that an entirely distinct question may arise. In what situations will a court be ousted of its jurisdiction to try a claim of sovereign immunity? The resolution of this
question lies in a consideration of the constitutional ramifications of the
interrelationship of the judiciary and the executive's control of foreign
affairs.
This Comment will trace the historical development of the two
substantive theories of sovereign immunity, and analyze the case law
that has developed. 7 The second point of departure will be the interrelationship between the judiciary and the executive, with special emphasis on whether the executive can have any effect on the judicial formulation of the substantive doctrine of sovereign immunity.

II.

THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

A.

The Schooner Exchange

The initial theoretical base of the doctrine of sovereign immunity
was articulated by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in The Schooner Exchange
v. McFadden.8 In July of 1811 a French naval vessel, The Balaou No. 5,
entered Philadelphia harbor by reason of some distress. During the
pendency of repairs a libel was filed against the ship in the federal district court. Two United States citizens who claimed to be the owners
of a schooner named The Exchange contended that their vessel had been
seized on the high seas by the French Navy, armed, and renamed The
Balaou No. 5. It was the prayer of the petitioners that they be restored
to the rightful possession of their vessel. A "suggestion" that the attach5. See C. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 308 (3d ed. 1948). For additional
discussion see Lauterpacht, The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign
States, in 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 220, 221-26 (1951); Fensterwald, Sovereign Immunity and Soviet State Trading, 63 HARV. L. REv. 614, 616-20 (1950).
6.

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

or FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW O1 THE UNITED STATES

Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor of the State Depart§ 69 (1965)
metn to Philip P. Perlman, Acting Attorney General, 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984
(1952); Bishop, New United States Policy Limiting Sovereign Immunity, 47 AM.
J. INT'L L. 93 (1953).
7. There is a distinction drawn in the cases between immunity from jurisdiction
and immunity from execution. However, no discussion of immunity from execution of

judgments will be attempted. Nor will the distinction be drawn between cases in
which an effective plea of sovereign immunity prevents the court from acquiring
in personam jurisdiction and those in which the court is merely prevented from
exercising its already acquired jurisdiction over property within the territory.
8. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
9. A "suggestion" is the formal means by which the executive branch of the
Government, through the State Department or other agency, makes a representation
to the court. It is communicated to the Attorney General who instructs the local
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss3/5
United States Attorney to make the appropriate representation to the court. See Feller,
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ment of the ship be dissolved and that the suit be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction was filed by the United States Attorney. Marshall, however,
addressed himself to the pertinent legal considerations, and the Court
affirmed the district court's dismissal of the action.
The theoretical basis of the doctrine of sovereign immunity asserted
in this opinion is a fusion of two components. The conclusion represents
an exercise of syllogistic reasoning concerning the practices of nations;
this is conjoined with an inductive demonstration that the demands of
the comity of nations, or international law, require recognition and application of the sovereign immunity concept. The Court, reasoning from the
unarticulated premise of "par non habet in paren imperium,"' ° concluded
that any forum state's authority within its territory must be absolute
and plenary, and that this authority admitted of no extrinsic limitation.
If restrictions on the sovereign's authority originated externally, a concomitant diminution of the sovereign's plenary power would result, and
there would necessarily be state inequality. The assumed maxim would
thus be contradicted, since the state imposing restraints on another
would, by this very fact, exercise authority over the latter. The premise
requires that all exemptions from the sovereign's absolute power must
come from within, from the consent of the sovereign state itself."
The Chief Justice then proceeded to demonstrate the factual application of this abstract conclusion. He enumerated three spheres of international relations in which the nation states have voluntarily and for their
mutual self-advantage ceded a portion of their inherent and absolute
authority. In these enumerated areas the states forbear from the exercise
of judicial power. Insofar as the customary practices of the nation
states comprise the corpus of international law, these concessions of authority may be said to derive their force from international law. The
Court enumerated, as the final sphere 12 in which the sovereign is understood to cede a portion of its territorial jurisdiction, the rights of foreign
military forces in transit across the territory of another sovereign. Assuming that the sovereign of the place of crossing has granted generally,
or in a specific instance, the right of free passage across its territory,
it is presumed that the state has waived jurisdiction over the force during
the passage. Thus, the consent to allow passage through the territory
implies an immunity not expressly stated - the freedom from the jurisdiction of the local sovereign. If the military force commences transit
without a general or specific authorization, no such presumption of
immunity arises. Such a qualification proceeds necessarily from the local
sovereign's right and duty to protect its territory. Addressing itself to the
Procedure in Cases Involving Immunity of Foreign States in Courts of the United
States, 25 Ams. J. INT'L L. 83, 86 (1931).
10. "An equal has no authority over an equal." Marshall's opinion is, in a sense,

a specific application of this principle.
11. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 136.
12. Id. at 139. The other two areas of ceded authority discussed are the exemption
from judicial process of the sovereign himself and his diplomatic ministers while.
Published
by Villanova
University
Charles
Widger
School of Law Digital Repository, 1968
in the territory
of another
state.
Id. at
137-39.
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case at bar, an armed public vessel in a domestic port, the Court applied,
by analogy, this third exception. There is no inordinate threat of harm
occasioned by the admission of a ship of war into a port of another state.
Thus, the Court concluded that if the port is open to ships of all nations,
an armed public vessel may enter and obtain the protection of the local
sovereign, and the immunity from jurisdiction, although no specific license
to enter is granted. 18
The foundation of these concessions is the common consent of the
nation states and their coequal dignity.
One sovereign being in no respect amenable to another; and being
bound by obligations of the highest character not to degrade the
dignity of his nation, by placing himself or its sovereign rights
within the jurisdiction of another, can be supposed to enter a
foreign territory only under an express license, or in the confidence
that the immunities belonging to his independent sovereign station,
though not expressly 14stipulated, are reserved by implication, and will
be extended to him.
Apparently Chief Justice Marshall was cognizant that this cession
of authority, compelled as it was by the necessity of intercourse among
states and the coequal dignity of the nations, formed a precept of international law. This is evidenced by his assertion that the immunity of an
armed ship of a foreign sovereign "seems .

.

. to be a principle of public

law." 1 Although the sovereign is capable of destroying the implication
of this ceded authority, the presumption that he has not breached his
implicit compact with the other nation states lies until some unequivocal
action to the contrary is taken. It therefore appears that in the absence
of affirmative action by the executive department to vitiate the cession
of jurisdictional authority, the courts in the United States must apply
this concept of sovereign immunity as a part of the federal common
law, for those customary practices of nation states which form a part
of international law are incorporated into the constitutional concept of
"the supreme Law of the Land."' 6
13. Id. at 141-44.
14. Id. at 137.
15. Id. at 145. Hackworth in a passage reiterating much of Marshall's thought
states:
These exemptions ... are theoretically based upon the consent, express or implied,
of the local state, upon the principle of equality of states in the eyes of international law, and upon the necessity of yielding the local jurisdiction in these
respects as an indispensable factor in the conduct of friendly intercourse between
members of the family of nations. While it is sometimes stated that they are
based upon international comity or courtesy, and while they doubtless find their
origin therein, they may now be said to be based upon generally accepted custom
and usage, i.e., international law.
2 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 393 (1941). One recent commentator has stated: "Sovereign immunity is perhaps the best example of a rule of
international law derived from the demands of 'comity' among supposedly friendly
nations." Cardozo, Judicial Deference to State Department Suggestions: Recognition
of Prerogative or Abdication to Usurper? 48 CORNELL L.Q. 461, 469 (1963).
16. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. See The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419 (1922)
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss3/5
Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 199 (1796).
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The opinion in The Schooner Exchange is considered the classic statement of the absolute theory of sovereign immunity.' 7 However, the
fundamental distinction between the activities of a sovereign in its public
capacity as opposed to those undertaken in a private capacity, the basis
of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, was evidenced in the
opinion: "A prince, by acquiring private property in a foreign country,
may possibly be considered as subjecting that property to the territorial
jurisdiction; he may be considered as so far laying down the prince,
and assuming the character of a private individual. ...."I Further, the
conduct of the French naval forces that formed the factual setting of
this opinion would have been exempted from judicial process under either
the absolute or restrictive theories of sovereign immunity, since the
conduct at issue could in no sense be termed as commercial in nature. 19
It might be more accurate to maintain that, although the rationale of
The Schooner Exchange had its foundation in the comity among states
and their coequal dignity, the actual holding of the case is somewhat
equivocal as to the exact scope of the doctrine. It is also significant that
the Court considered the merits of the defendant's claim after the
executive had filed a suggestion of immunity.

B.

Early Case Law

For more than a hundred years following The Schooner Exchange
the vast majority of the cases involving a possible plea of sovereign
immunity were suits in admiralty. 20 Ships of foreign nations were libeled
in American ports, and jurisdiction in rem and quasi in rem was thereby
established. The opinions in these cases are weighted with references to
The Schooner Exchange. Immunity was generally granted to those ships
in the actual possession of a foreign government and employed for a
17. Berizzi Bros. Co. v. The Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 573 (1926); Ocean Transp.
Co. v. Republic of Ivory Coast, 269 F. Supp. 703 (E.D. La. 1967). See Fensterwald,
Sovereign Immunity and Soviet State Trading, 63 HARV. L. RINv. 614, 617-18 (1950).
18. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 145. It was thus very consistent for Marshall to assert
twelve years after The Schooner Exchange:
[W]hen a government becomes a partner in any trading company, it devests [sic]

itself, so far as concerns the transactions of that company, of its sovereign character, and takes that of a private citizen. Instead of communicating to the company
its privileges and its prerogatives, it descends to a level with those with whom
it associates itself....
Bank of United States v. Planters Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904, 907 (1824).
19. This action might be considered to be an act of expropriation or nationalization. The State Department has in fact suggested immunity for an act of nationalization. Chemical Natural Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Venezuela, 420 Pa. 134, 215
A.2d 864 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 822 (1967).
20. Cases did arise outside the admiralty area. See Oliver Am. Trading Co. v.
United States of Mexico, 5 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1924) (the plaintiff was not permitted
to sue the defendant for its unlawful confiscation of the plaintiff's property). Although
a plea of sovereign immunity was raised, the court determined that the rights of
the parties were determined by treaty provisions. In French Republic v. Board of
Supervisors,
200 Ky.
18, 252
S.W.
124 School
(1923),of Law
the Digital
right Repository,
of the French
Published
by Villanova
University
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Widger
1968 Republic
to be exempted from state tobacco taxes was considered.
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public purpose. 21 Mere governmental ownership of the vessel, without
allegation of public use and possession, was, however, held to be
22
insufficient.
A significant number of these cases arose during World War I, and
the exigencies of the political situation demanded an expansion of the
doctrine's range of application. Due to the necessity of supplying war
material and other essentials during this critical period it was imperative
that the ships employed for this purpose be free from attachment and
sale in tort and breach of contract actions.
A resultant shift in emphasis to possession and purpose occurred which
decidedly broadened the doctrine's scope beyond the three enumerated
spheres of ceded authority which Marshall demonstrated. Thus the
international law foundation of the doctrine was expanded to encompass
28
current national practice.
24
An interesting refinement took place in the case of The Roseric.
A privately owned vessel requisitioned for use by the British Navy was
held to be immune from jurisdiction so long as she was used for a public
purpose - this despite the fact that her officers and crew remained in
the employ of the vessel's private owners.25 In commenting on its expansion of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the court stated: "The privilege
was based on the idea that the sovereign's property devoted to state
purposes is free and exempt from all judicial process to enforce private
claims. Such idea is as cogently applicable to an unarmed vessel employed
by the sovereign in the public service as it is to one of his battleships. '26
By assuming that the foundation of the decision in The Schooner Exchange
was the employment of the property for a public purpose the court was
able to distinguish the factual situation before it from that portion of
Marshall's opinion wherein he determined that private ships need not
be accorded the same exemption as public, armed vessels. 27 It is not the
ownership or the exclusive possession of the property by the sovereign,
asserted the court, but rather "its appropriation . . . to such [public]
21. The Carlo Poma, 259 F. 369 (2d Cir. 1919) ; The Attualita, 238 F. 909 (4th
Cir. 1916); The Pampa, 245 F. 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1917).
22. Long v. The Tampico, 16 F. 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1883); accord, The Beaton
Park, 65 F. Supp. 211 (W.D. Wash. 1946); The Uxmal, 40 F. Supp. 258 (D.
Mass. 1941).
23. The Attualita, 238 F. 909 (4th Cir. 1916) ; The Maipo, 252 F. 627 (S.D.N.Y.
1918) ; The Pampa, 245 F. 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1917).
24. 254 F. 154 (D.N.J. 1918).
25. On quite similar facts the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to hold
as immune from suit a vessel owned by the Italian government in The Attualita,
238 F. 909 (4th Cir. 1916). The court held that the ship was not in the actual
possession of the Italian government on the basis that the owners remained in
possession and in effect chartered the ship to the government. See Societa Commerciale Italiana di Navigazione v. Maru Nay. Co., 280 F. 334 (4th Cir. 1922);
The Luigi, 230 F. 493 (E.D. Pa. 1916) ; Riesenfeld, Sovereign Immunity of Foreign
Vessels in Anglo-American Law: The Evolution of a Legal Doctrine, 25 MINN. L.
Riv. 1 (1940).
26. 254 F. at 158.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss3/5
27. Id. at 157.
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service, that exempts it from judicial process." 28 However, The Schooner
Exchange rested more properly on the sovereign character of the actor
and the state's responsibility to other sovereigns, rather than on notions
of public use. This isolation of the public purpose rationale for a rule
of decision in The Roseric will be seen to have important ramifications.
In the same year as The Roseric, 1918, The Maipo29 was decided.
A vessel engaged in an admittedly commercial enterprise was libeled,80
notwithstanding the allegation that the vessel was a transport of the
Chilean Navy. As framed by the court, the issue was whether the
ship, despite its commercial pursuit, ought to be exempted from judicial
process if owned by another sovereign. In contradistinction to the holding
in The Roseric, the court considered as the determining factor in The
Schooner Exchange the notion that property of a sovereign owned in its
sovereign capacity and in its possession is immune from judicial proceedings. 81 Its interpretation of The Schooner Exchange is apparently
based on the logical assumption that since Marshall stated that all property
held by the sovereign in a private capacity is not exempted, then he must
by necessary implication have intended that all property held in a public
capacity is immune from judicial process.3 2 The court did not overtly
find that The Schooner Exchange called for immunity of all vessels
engaged in a public purpose as did the court in The Roseric. Nevertheless,
it determined that immunity should be granted to this ship despite its
commercial activity since the economic enterprise in which it was engaged
was of a benefit to the entire population of the state. 33 The holding in
this case may, therefore, be considered as a specific application of the
public purpose rationale of The Roseric, notwithstanding the difference in
conceptual approach. Such an interpretation may indicate that war time
exigencies demanded an expansion of the public purpose concept to encompass activities normally considered as commercial. Alternatively, it
may be construed as limiting the judicial inquiry to only the question of
ownership, and, once it is determined that the owner is in a sovereign
state, immunity attaches, even if the activity is commercial in nature.
This latter view is supported by the court's statement that in consideration
of the existing war conditions "[fit is not to be presumed . . .that . . .

our own government, will fail to do what is just and fair in connection
28.
29.
30.
by the

Id. at 161-62.
252 F. 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1918).
The vessel was libeled to provide quasi in rem jurisdiction for a suit brought
libellants for damage to a cargo of hides which the ship was transporting.

It is interesting to note that although The Maipo was owned by the Chilean Navy and
manned by naval personnel, it was in fact chartered to the libellants.
31. Id. at 629.
32. This is not a necessary logical conclusion. If a system is composed of only
A's and B's, the fact that all B's are also C's does not compel the conclusion that no

A's are C's.

33. 252 F. at 630-31. This statement illustrates one difficulty encountered by
adherents to the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. Even commercial acts
when engaged in by a government manifest a public purpose, since they are entered
Published
Villanova
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1968
into forbythe
good of the state.
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with operations of a commercial character. '34 Whichever of these two
positions is accepted, it appears that the desire to protect American interests through the expectation of reciprocal treatment provided the incentive
for expansion of the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
The early cases proved to be flexible in meeting the demands of
changing and varying circumstances. However, subsequent conflicting
threads can be traced to these cases.
C. Berizzi: Establishment of the Absolute Theory
Following World War I the Supreme Court decidedly broadened the
prior concepts of sovereign immunity. In Berizzi Bros. v. The Pesaro"5
the Supreme Court effectively adopted the absolute theory of sovereign
immunity. A vessel, The Pesaro, was libeled to provide the jurisdictional
basis for a breach of contract action. As stated by the Court, the issue to
be decided was identical to that in The Maipo: whether a ship, engaged
in the purely commercial venture of transporting merchandise for hire,
should be granted immunity because it was owned and possessed by a
sovereign state, the Italian government. For resolution of this question
Mr. Justice Van Devanter relied upon The Schooner Exchange:
We think the principles [of The Schooner Exchange] are applicable alike to all ships held and used by a government for a public
purpose, and that when, for the purpose of advancing the trade of
its people or providing revenue for its treasury, government acquires,
mans and operates ships in the carrying trade, they are public ships
in the same sense that war ships are. We know of no international
usage which regards the maintenance and advancement of the economic welfare of a people in time of peace as any less a public
purpose than the maintenance and training of a naval force. 3
This approach is precisely the reverse of that employed by Judge Mack
in the lower court opinion wherein the claim of sovereign immunity was
disallowed.
[T]he immunity of a public ship should depend primarily not upon
her ownership but upon the nature of the service in which she is
engaged and the purpose for which she is employed....
• . . [I]mmunity should not be given vessels owned and employed
by the government in ordinary times in the usual channels of trade. 37
In this latter opinion Judge Mack succinctly applied a restrictive approach
to the application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. In contrast, Mr.
Justice Van Devanter in the Supreme Court opinion demonstrated a definite
34. 252 F. at 631.
35. 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
36. Id. at 574.
37. The Pesaro, 277 F. 473, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). This same thought is expressed
again in the opinion: "[A] government ship should not be immune from seizure as
,such, but only by reason of the nature of the service in which she is engaged." Id. at 482.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss3/5
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adherence to, and application of, the absolute theory of sovereign
immunity,38 Hence a determination of the character of the actor becomes
the paramount consideration. Once the actor is found to be a sovereign
state, the distinction between governmental functions and commercial
activities is meaningless.3 9 All its activities should be exempted from
judicial process. Inasmuch as the decision in Berizzi Bros. is grounded
on, and purports to be an expansion of, The Schooner Exchange doctrine,
it too must be founded on international law.
However, even if the distinction between public and private purpose,
which forms the basis of the restrictive theory, were to be acknowledged,
the Berizzi Court stripped this distinction of its reality by adopting an
expansive interpretation of the public purpose test of The Roseric. All
activities of a sovereign, including its ownership of property, were characterized as public in nature since they were directed toward the public good.
Therefore, the concept of public purpose subsumes what some had argued
to be private activity.
D.

The Stone Trilogy and the Foreign Affairs Power

A little more than a decade after Berizzi Bros. was decided, the
Supreme Court, in three decisions authored by Mr. Justice Stone.
effectively interjected a new aspect into the concept of sovereign immunity that was distinct from that of The Schooner Exchange. In the
first of the Stone trilogy, Compania Espanola de Navegacion Maritima,
S.A. v. The Navemar,40 the alleged owner of a Spanish merchant ship,
The Navemar, filed a libel in the federal district court to recover possession of the ship. After the State Department refused to request immunity, a suggestion of immunity was submitted to the court by the

Spanish Ambassador. It was asserted therein that the vessel was the
public property of the Spanish Republic and was therefore exempted
from the procedure of the court. There are, declared Mr. Justice Stone,
two methods by which a foreign state may assert the public status of
property and its attending immunity from judicial process. It may make a
diplomatic representation of the public ownership of the property to the
State Department, or it may intervene in the suit as a claimant to the
property.4 1 Should the foreign state elect the former procedure, then
"[i]f the claim is recognized and allowed by the executive branch of
the government, it is then the duty of the courts to release the vessel
38.
vention
request
vessels

The adoption of the absolute theory of sovereign immunity was in contraof State Department policy. In answer to the Italian Ambassador's diplomatic
for immunity, the State Department took the position that government-owned
engaged in commerce were not entitled to immunity. 2 G. HACKWORTH,

DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 434 (1941).

39. See Cardozo, Sovereign Immunity: The Plaintiff Deserves a Day in Court,
L. Rev. 608, 609 (1954).
40. 303 U.S. 68 (1938).
41. See Ex parte Muir, 254 U.S. 522 (1921). The Restatement position is in
accord. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW oF THE UNITED
STATESby§ Villanova
71 (1965).University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1968
Published
67
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upon appropriate suggestion by the Attorney General .... ,,42 Alternatively,
if the foreign state determines to appear as a claimant in the suit and
does not make a diplomatic representation to the State Department or if
the State Department has refused to "recognize and allow" the claim,
"the want of admiralty jurisdiction because of the alleged public status
of the vessel . . . [is an] appropriate [subject] for judicial inquiry upon

proof of the matters alleged."' 43 Should this latter procedure be followed,
the foreign state must prove factually that the "vessel . . . [is] in its possession and service. . . ."44 Such a requirement of factual proof is an

advance from the position of the courts in some of the earlier admiralty
cases such as The Carlo Poma45 and The Rogday.46 In these cases the
suggestion, or allegation of public possession and use, which the foreign
diplomatic representative made to the court, was itself held to be con47
clusive proof of the facts alleged.
Of more decided import is the declaration of a new basis for the
allowance of a claim of sovereign immunity. The issue of sovereign
immunity is, by the holding in The Navemar, both a political and a judicial
question. If the issue is presented politically through a representation
made to the State Department by the foreign nation and a "recognition
and allowance" of the claim by that organ of the executive branch is presented to the court, it must be given cognizance. The effect of the suggestion is to oust the court of jurisdiction. If, instead, the matter is put
at issue through an appearance by the foreign state in the suit, then the
court will determine the efficacy of the plea in accord with accepted legal
precedent. It is noteworthy that the interjection of the political aspect
by the court in The Navemar does not affect the theoretical legal basis
of sovereign immunity. The opinion assumes that the State Department
42. 303 U.S. at 74. Justice Stone apparently relied on the following language
in The Schooner Exhange: "[T]here seems to be a necessity for admitting that the
fact [of immunity] might be disclosed to the court by the suggestion of the attorney

for the United States." 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 147. This statement lends little support to his proposition. The origin of his concept is more accurately derived from
a passage in United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
[Q]uestions . . . which . . . might involve war and peace, must be primarily
dealt with by those departments of this government which had the power to
adjust them. . . . In such cases the judicial department of the government
follows the action of the political branch, and will not embarrass the latter by
assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction.
Id. at 209.
43. 303 U.S. at 75. The decision of the Court was that the Spanish government
should be permitted to intervene in the cases as an actual suitor and present its
claim of actual possession and public use in that capacity. In the proceeding below
she intervened but not as an actual party. 18 F. Supp. 153 (E.D.N.Y. 1937). In
Ex parte Muir, the British Ambassador was not permitted to claim sovereign immunity in an amici curiae capacity. Sovereign immunity could be claimed only by
a party. To the same effect is the Supreme Court decision in The Pesaro, 255 U.S.
216 (1921), an earlier case involving the same facts as Berizzi Bros v. The Pesaro,
271 U.S. 562 (1926).
44. 303 U.S. at 74.
45. 259 F. 369 (2d Cir. 1919), rev'd on other grounds, 255 U.S. 219 (1921).
46. 279 F. 130 (N.D. Cal. 1920).
47. It should be noted that even if the factual evidence of state ownership and
possession is insufficient to meet the requirements for a successful plea of sovereign
immunity, the state may very well prove a superior title on the merits.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss3/5
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will make a determination in accord with the traditional norms. Thus
the courts merely substitute a factual determination made by the executive
branch for their own.
Ex parte Republic of Peru48 provided Mr. Justice Stone with the
opportunity to reaffirm the concepts of The Navemar and to further
explicate their underlying basis. A Cuban corporation libeled the vessel

Ucayali for the failure of its owner, a corporate agent of the Peruvian
government, to comply with the terms of a contract. Following the procedural requirements of The Navemar, the Peruvian government sought
and obtained a suggestion of sovereign immunity from the State Department. Apparently the State Department determined itself bound by the
Supreme Court's adoption of the absolute theory of sovereign immunity in
Berizzi Bros., for prior to that case the State Department had not readily
granted a suggestion of immunity when the foreign government was
49
engaged in purely commercial transactions.
Justice Stone again asserted that in the absence of a State Department recognition and allowance of immunity the courts have the prerogative to determine themselves whether the requisite conditions for
a plea of sovereign immunity have been satisfied.50 However, when,
as in the case at bar, the State Department has made the determination,
the courts are bound to conform themselves to a principle of substantive
law:
That principle is that courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction,
by the seizure and detention of the property of a friendly sovereign, as
to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting
foreign relations. "In such cases the judicial department . . . follows

the action of the political branch, and will not embarrass the latter by
assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction".

. .

. More specifically, the

judicial seizure of the vessel of a friendly sovereign state is so serious
a challenge to its dignity, and may so affect our friendly relations
with it, that the courts are required to accept and follow . . . [that]
determination ....51

Although The Schooner Exchange is cited by Justice Stone as support
for this general proposition, there appears to be no direct reference to
the concept of a separation of powers and the exclusive executive control
over the conduct of foreign affairs. Concededly, Chief Justice Marshall
did grant immunity to and relinquish jurisdiction over the Balaou No. 5
in an instance where a suggestion was filed, but he did so out of compliance with the dictates of the comity of nations and international law
48. 318 U.S. 578 (1943).
49. See The Attualita, 238 F. 909 (4th Cir. 1916); G.
INTERNATIONAL LAW 423-36 (1941).

HACKWORTH,

DirEST O

50. 318 U.S. at 588.
51. Id. The quotation of the Court is from United States v. Lee, 106 U.S.
196, 209by (1882).
Published
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as he judicially found them and not through the constitutional compul52
sion of the doctrine of separation of powers.
In The Navemar and Peru the Supreme Court enunciated a new
theoretical basis for the application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity
parallel to that stated in The Schooner Exchange. When an executive
determination to recognize and allow the plea of sovereign immunity has
been made by the State Department, the courts are required to give it
conclusive effect. But when no suggestion has been sought from the
executive branch, or if a request is rejected by it, the courts may, under
the rationale of The Schooner Exchange, as sanctioned by both The
Navemar and Peru, determine for themselves the efficacy of the plea
of sovereign immunity. Both of these opinions allow a conclusive factual
determination to be made by the executive branch, one that precludes
an independent determination by the judiciary. It is presumed that the
State Department will utilize in its factfinding process the same standards
that are used by the courts. Thus the theoretical basis of the doctrine of
sovereign immunity is not changed. As a matter of substantive law the
doctrine is still governed by precepts of international law. In effect, the
separation of powers and exclusive executive department control of
foreign affairs arguments, as stated in both The Navemar and Peru,
may be characterized as jurisdictional in nature. An executive factual
determination ousts the courts of their jurisdiction to decide the question
of sovereign immunity.
In the last of the three Stone opinions, Republic of Mexico v.
Hoffman,53 the distinction between the political and judicial functions in the
formulation and application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, as put
forth in The Navemar and Peru, was severely reoriented. An attempt
was also made to supplant it with an alternative theoretical basis.
The vessel Baja California was libeled to provide the jurisdictional
base for a maritime tort action. The Mexican Ambassador filed a suggestion with the court that the ship was owned by the Mexican government. Though a representation was made to the State Department, no
suggestion of "recognition and allowance" of immunity was issued. The
Mexican government then defended the suit on the merits and attempted
to use sovereign immunity as an affirmative defense. As presented for
the Supreme Court's determination the question was whether the mere
fact that title was vested in a foreign state was, in itself, sufficient
to allow or require judicial recognition of sovereign immunity. Relying on
his opinion in Peru, Justice Stone reasserted that in the absence of State
Department recognition and allowance of sovereign immunity the courts

52. U.S. CosT. art. II, § 2; see Cardozo, Judicial Deference to State Department Suggestions: Recognition of Prerogative or Abdication to Usurper? 48
CORNtLL L.Q. 461, 469-75 (1963) ; Frank, The Courts, The State Department and
National Policy: A Criterion for Judicial Abdication, 44 MINN. L. Rvv. 1101-04,
1114-19 (1960).
53. 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss3/5
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may determine whether the requisites for such immunity exist. In this
opinion, however, Stone declared that such a judicial determination must
be made in accord with executive policy:
It is therefore not for the courts to deny an immunity which our
government has seen fit to allow, or to allow an immunity on new
grounds which the government has not seen fit to recognize ...
[R]ecognition by the courts of an immunity upon principles which
the political department of government has not sanctioned may be
equally embarrassing to it in securing the protection of our national
54
interests ....
In applying this principle to the facts of the case, Stone found that it
had never been the State Department's policy to recognize sovereign
immunity on mere assertion by a foreign state of title alone, but only
on allegations of possession and public use.5 5 This qualification of the
former position which Stone put forth in The Navemar and Peru decisions may be somewhat unsound, and it may in fact yield a result
in direct opposition to that which he intended. 56 It forces the court to
consider past executive policy as the sole source of the substantive metes
and bounds of the doctrine. For example, if in the past the State Department had recognized and allowed a plea of sovereign immunity in a
particular situation, and yet for extraneous political reasons the Department deems it expedient not to issue a recognition and allowance of immunity in this individual case, the court would nonetheless be forced
to recognize and allow the plea of sovereign immunity at the trial on the
merits; this would be necessitated by an adherence to past executive
policy to do so under these factual conditions.5 7
Conceptually, this qualified position which Stone took in Hoffman
obliterates the neat distinction between the situations in which a suggestion is interposed by the State Department and instances in which
no suggestion is filed or requested. It reduces the issue to one of solely
political concern. 58 Hoffman appears to grant to the executive control
of the substantive doctrine of sovereign immunity. Under the rationale of
The Navemar and Peru it was assumed that the determination of the
54. Id. at 35-36. In a footnote the Court indicated its displeasure with the
decision in Berizzi Bros. wherein the Court upheld a plea of sovereign immunity despite
the refusal of the State Department to issue a suggestion.
55. Id. at 38.
56. The rationale did work properly on the particular facts of Hoffman. It had
never been the State Department's policy to grant sovereign immunity on a mere
assertion of title, but only in cases of public use and possession.
57. Such a situation would be the precise reverse of Berizzi Bros.
58. Cardozo, Sovereign Immunity: The Plaintiff Deserves a Day in Court, 67
HARV. L. Rsv. 608 (1954).

Whether a defendant is entitled to immunity as a sovereign depends on the
resolution of two issues: (1) is it considered a sovereign government? and (2)
will the interests of foreign relations be furthered by relieving it from responding
in court? . . . [N]either of these issues is a question of law to be left to the
courts for decision.

Id. at 614. See Jessup, Has the Supreme Court Abdicated

One of Its Functions? 40
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State Department would be in accord with the accepted legal norms;59
however, this literal reading of Hoffman reverses that presumption. Now
the judicial determination is merely one of fact which must be made in
light of the executive's substantive interpretation of the doctrine.
The lower courts have not considered themselves bound by such an
interpretation of Hoffman. Instead, they have refused to go beyond the
Peru position, and they assert that in the absence of State Department
action they may determine the effectiveness of a plea of sovereign immunity in accord with traditional legal principles.60 Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Hoffman lends credence to this more
restrictive reading of the opinion.
It is my view . . . that courts should not disclaim jurisdiction which
otherwise belongs to them. . . . except when "the department of the
government charged with the conduct of our foreign relations," or
of course Congress, explicitly asserts that the proper conduct of these
61
relations calls for judicial abstention.
Such a statement indicates judicial disfavor for total executive or political
control of the substantive doctrine of sovereign immunity.
It is significant that in the recent authoritative treatment of the
question of sovereign immunity, the Restatement (Second) of Foreign
Relations Law, the Hoffman qualification - that sovereign immunity is
exclusively a political question to be determined by the executive branch applies only when the issue is raised diplomatically through a representation to the State Department. Section 72 provides:
(1) [A] suggestion [of immunity] from the executive branch of
the government ... is conclusive as to issues determined by executive
action within the exclusive constitutional competence of the executive
branch . . . and as to other issues directly affecting the conduct
of foreign relations. As to all other issues, such a suggestion will
be given great weight.
(2) [Aln objection made by the government of a foreign state
through its accredited diplomatic representative ... raises an issue for
disposition by the court or other enforcing agency upon the basis
62
of proof.
Mr. Justice Stone's three opinions have had marked effect on the
current status of the doctrine. He created the distinction between what
has been characterized as the jurisdictional or political aspects of the
doctrine and its substantive content. The Navemar and Peru were his
59. In The Navemar the State Department granted immunity to commercial
activity relying on the Supreme Court's adoption of the absolute theory of sovereign
immunity in Berizzi Bros.
60. E.g., In re Investigation of World Arrangements, 13 F.R.D. 280 (D.D.C.
1952); United States of Mexico v. Schmuck, 293 N.Y. 264, 56 N.E.2d 577 (1944).
61. 324 U.S. at 41-42.
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) ov FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW or THE UNITED STATES
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss3/5
§ 72 (1965) (emphasis added).
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vehicles for this. Subsequently, however, he merged these two aspects
in the Hoffman case. Despite this final turn, the Hoffman qualification has
been largely disregarded. The courts have felt free to determine, in the
absence of a State Department suggestion, the existence vel non of the
requisites for an effective plea of sovereign immunity, and this determination has been made in accord with traditional legal precedent, not executive
policy. Since 1952, however, this distinction between the substantive basis
of the doctrine and its jurisdictional aspects has taken on a marked significance. It serves as a basis for an analysis of the cases decided after
the issuance of the Tate Letter.
III.

THE TATE LETTER -

PRESENT CONFUSION

In 1952 the Acting Legal Advisor to the State Department, Mr. Jack
B. Tate, in a letter directed to the Attorney General,"8 articulated an
official State Department position on sovereign immunity: "[I]t will
hereafter be the Department's policy to follow the restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity.... -64 Such a declaration was based on the familiar
objections to the absolute theory: (1) it is anomalous and unfair to exempt a foreign sovereign state from responsibility for its actions when
most governments have consented to allow themselves to be sued in their
domestic courts under provisions similiar to the Federal Tort Claims Act6 5
and the Tucker Act;66 (2) the absolute necessity of governmental
commercial activity makes it equally imperative that persons who engage
in such transactions with governments have available to them forums in
which causes of action arising from such transactions might be adjudi67
cated.
Near the conclusion of this letter Mr. Tate asserted:
It is realized that a shift in policy by the executive cannot control
the courts but it is felt that the courts are less likely to allow a plea
of sovereign immunity where the executive has declined to do so.
There have been indications that at least some Justices of the Supreme
Court feel that in this matter courts should follow the branch of the
Government charged with responsibility for the conduct of foreign
relations. 68

This enigmatic paragraph embodies, and is in part responsible for, the
current difficulties in the application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Several possible interpretations may be assigned to it which essentially
embody the distinctions made in the prior Supreme Court cases.
63. 26 DEP'T STATP BULL. 984 (1952).
64. Id. at 985.
65. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1964).
66. 28 U.S.C. § 1496 (1964).

67. See National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955) ; Lauterpacht, The Problem of JurisdictionalImmunities of Foreign States, in 28 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 220 (1951).
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Conceivably this statement by Mr. Tate may express a State Department view that the courts are not bound in any manner by its suggestions.
Under such a reading not only would a court be free to disregard a State
Department suggestion, but it would also sanction the judicial practice of
making independent determination of the present legal scope of the doctrine. It is evident that such an interpretation would be contrary to the
position of The Navemar, Peru, and the Restatement that a court is ousted
of jurisdiction by a suggestion. Also, this interpretation would imply
an affirmation of the absolute theory of Berizzi Bros. Mr. Tate quite
apparently did not intend this construction, for it reduces the Tate Letter
to an exercise in futility.
Directly opposed to this first construction is the reading of the
Tate Letter which in fact approaches the Hoffman position. Not only
must a court give conclusive effect to a State Department suggestion when
one is issued, but even when the question is presented judicially the
court must, in considering the efficacy of the plea, be guided by executive
policy. Under this reading, in the absence of a suggestion, there is room
for a legal determination of the fact. However, the scope of the legal
doctrine would be guided by executive policy - i.e., the content of the
doctrine would be solely one of political concern.
Such an interpretation has a vital flaw if the literal language of the
letter were carried to its logical conclusion, and may result in a finding
by a court that the court need not follow present State Department policy.
After reading the second sentence of the quoted paragraph in conjunction
with the Hoffman decision a court may feel constrained to defer to the
State Department's past policy of adherence to the restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity, even in the absence of a suggestion from the executive branch. However, if the court were to carry its analysis one step
further it would find itself in a circular line of reasoning. After deferring
to the executive as Hoffman would require, the court may conclude from
the first sentence of the quoted passage that it is not the State Department
policy to require compliance. The court, therefore, would reach the position that it would not be bound by the executive's declared policy, and
it would decide the question of sovereign immunity according to prior
precedent. This is equivalent to the result under the first interpretation.
Presumably, most courts would not take this last step, but instead would
confine themselves to the Hoffman position.
The final construction of the Tate Letter is essentially that expressed
in section 72 of the Restatement. When the State Department has suggested immunity, it is conclusive upon the courts. If no suggestion is
sought by the foreign state, or if the State Department has refused to
honor the request, the issue, if presented to the court, is to be determined
in accord with prevailing international law. This latter situation is identical
to the construction employed in the first reading of the passage, although
limited to cases in which no suggestion is filed by the State Department.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss3/5
There is no executive control over the substantive contours of the doctrine.
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If the executive has issued a suggestion it is unimportant to determine
whether the court's deference to the State Department is on a political level
or is but an acceptance of the restrictive theory, because in those instances
where the State Department applies the restrictive theory, a fortiori the
sovereign would qualify under the absolute theory.
In light of such ambiguous, or virtually nonexistent guidelines, it
is understandable that the courts differ on the effect to be given a suggestion of immunity which is granted by the State Department in accord
with the policy of the Tate Letter. In the only Supreme Court decision
which has discussed the doctrine since the issuance of the Tate Letter,
National City Bank v. Republic of China,6 9 Mr. Justice Frankfurter enunciated a detailed criticism of the absolute theory; however, he wrote
only one sentence, and that guardedly neutral, on the Tate Letter: "Recently the State Department has pronounced broadly against recognizing
sovereign immunity for the commercial operations of a foreign government."7 0° Obviously, no guidance can be gleaned from this reference by
the Supreme Court. Therefore the courts, in the absence of any definitive
criteria, have taken diverse positions.
In several cases, such as Frazier v. Hanover Bank 71 and Stephen v.
Zivnostenska Banka,72 the New York courts have seemingly adopted the
first reading of the Tate Letter in instances where suggestions were
presented. Both of these cases essentially involved disputed claims to
assets held in New York banks. The courts did not give a conclusive
effect to the State Department suggestions. Rather they proceeded to
73
factually determine if the suit did involve a claim against a sovereign.
This approach is not firmly supported by a close reading of the Tate
Letter. The thrust of the letter pertains to instances in which a suggestion
is not issued. No implication is apparent that would call for a position
contrary to that of The Navemar and Peru - that a court is always bound
when a suggestion is issued.
In numerous other decisions the courts have given a broad and
conclusive effect to the State Department suggestions of immunity. Once
they are issued, the suit must be dismissed. 74 Possibly the circuit court
69. 348 U.S. 356 (1955).

70. Id. at 361.
71. 204 Misc. 922, 119 N.Y.S.2d 319 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 281 App. Div. 861, 119
N.Y.S.2d 918 (1953).
72. 15 App. Div. 2d 111, 222 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1961), aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 781, 235
N.Y.S.2d 1, 186 N.E.2d 676 (1962).
73. In the Frazier case the court found that the claims to the funds were in effect
claims against a sovereign and allowed a plea of immunity. In the Stephen case
immunity was not granted to the Czechoslovakian government. In commenting on
what he deems to be the lamentable judicial deference to State Department suggestions, Mr. Justice Musmanno, dissenting in Chemical Natural Resources, Inc. v.
Republic of Venezuela, 420 Pa. 134, 215 A.2d 864 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 822
(1967), stated: "The majority Opinion in this case is built on an erroneous concept
of the law, namely, that once the State Department whispers sovereign immunity
the Courts must close their doors to everyone who may come within the breeze of the
zephyric suggestion." Id. at 178-79, 215 A.2d at 886.
74. Ocean Transp. Co. v. Republic of Ivory Coast, 269 F. Supp. 703 (E.D. La.
1967) ;byUnited
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opinion in Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A. 76 exemplifies the most extreme
judicial deference to the State Department's political determination. In
a suit containing a great many collateral and purely judicial matters,
including an alleged waiver of sovereign immunity, the court dismissed
the suit with the remark that "our Constitution requires us to assume
that all pertinent considerations have been taken into account by the
Secretary of State."76 Such a statement strongly affirms an adherence to
the position that a suggestion is always binding when issued by the
executive.
In situations where no suggestion is issued, the second reading of
the Tate Letter, the Hoffman approach, and the third reading, the
Restatement view, are both pertinent. Under the latter, in the absence
of a suggestion the court could apply the existing absolute theory of
Berizzi Bros. However, under the Hoffman approach the court would have
to take cognizance of the State Department's adoption of the restrictive
theory and would premise its judicial determination on that theory. The
application of the absolute theory presents relatively few problems, but
the courts face a difficult task in determining what is or is not a commercial act under the State Department's restrictive theory. A brief overview of the cases is indicative of this difficulty.
Originally the Department's position was quite narrow and evinced
an overly zealous adherence to the literal language of the Tate Letter. In
New York & Cuba Mail S.S. Co. v. Republic of Korea,77 one of the
plaintiff's ships was unloading rice in the harbor of Pusan, Korea, as
per a contract of transportation entered into by the plaintiff and defendant.
One of the Korean government's small tenders, while assisting in this
operation, collided with the plaintiff's vessel. The Korean government did
not intend commercial sale of the cargo, rather it distributed the rice to
feed the civilian and military population during the Korean crisis. Notwithstanding this factual setting, the State Department refused to recognize the Korean government's claim of immunity.
In many cases a factual situation is presented which would fall
outside the restrictive theory; nevertheless, in several more recent cases
the State Department has felt compelled by the pressures of political
considerations to issue a suggestion of immunity. In looking to these
decisions the courts find themselves trying to reconcile opposed positions
the Tate Letter's adherence to the restrictive theory and the issuance
of a suggestion in a particular case.
v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 197 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. Va.), aff'd per curiam, 295 F.2d
24 (4th Cir. 1961); State v. Dekla, 137 So. 2d 581 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962);
Chemical Natural Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Venezuela, 420 Pa. 134, 215 A.2d 864
(1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 822 (1967).
75. 197 F. Supp. 710 (ED. Va.), aff'd per curiam, 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961).
76. 295 F.2d at 26.
77. 132 F. Supp. 648 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 238 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1956). Jurisdiction
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss3/5
was acquired by attaching Korean assets in a New York bank.
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In Chemical Natural Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Venezuela78
the plaintiff attached a ship belonging to the defendant that was engaged
in commercial activity. On the basis of the jurisdiction thus acquired,
he sued the defendant for breach of contract alleging unilateral cancellation of concessions, breach of a construction contract, and illegal nationalization of property. The Pennsylvania supreme court determined, despite
a vigorous dissent by Justice Musmanno, that conclusive effect must be
given to the suggestion of immunity issued by the State Department. 9
Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A.80 presented similar political exigencies. A
Cuban merchant ship bound from Cuba to Russia with a cargo of sugar
turned into a Virginia port, whereupon several members of the crew
sought asylum. The ship was libeled to satisfy outstanding judgments
against the original owners of the vessel; these same owners also brought
a libel in an attempt to regain its possession. Although the ship was engaged in a purely commercial venture, the State Department acceded to the
Castro regime's protestation of immunity. Consequently, the court determined itself to be conclusively bound by the suggestion of immunity
issued by the executive. Such cases present little difficulty in themselves.
Under either the second or third interpretation of the Tate Letter, the
courts are undeniably bound by the suggestion since it emanates from the
foreign relations power. The problem presented by such cases is the lack
of discernible criteria which they offer to a court which feels itself bound
by the Hoffman interpretation of the Tate Letter. At present it is not possible for a court to discern precisely what the executive policy is.
Victory Transp. Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y
Transportes8l provides the only attempt at a judicial solution of this
dilemma. In this Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals opinion Judge Smith,
in the absence of a suggestion, adopted the Hoffman approach and attempted to implement the restrictive theory by delineating the difference
between governmental and commercial acts. A rather conservative approach was adopted in that sovereign immunity need only be granted by
a court if the activities are:
(1) internal administrative acts, such as expulsion of an alien,
legislative acts, such as nationalization,

(2)
(3)

acts concerning the armed forces,

78. 420 Pa. 134, 215 A.2d 864 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 822 (1967).
79. Concededly the State Department may have issued a suggestion of immunity
in this case in an attempt to thwart application of the Hickenlooper Amendment,
Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-633, Part III, ch. 1, § 301, 78 Stat.
1009, which would have enabled the court to consider if the nationalization or expropriation was in violation of international law despite the Supreme Court decision in
Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). For a discussion of the
interrelation between the act of state doctrine and sovereign immunity see American
Hawaiian Ventures, Inc. v. M.V.J. Latuharhary, 257 F. Supp. 622 (D.N.J. 1966);
Note, The Castro Government in American Courts: Sovereign Immunity and The

Act of State Doctrine, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1607 (1962).
80. 197 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. Va.), aff'd per curiam, 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961).
81. by336
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(4) acts concerning diplomatic activity,
82
(5) public loans.
Such a set of criteria exempts only those acts which are strictly political.
It would have authorized a grant of immunity in the Chemical Natural
Resources case because a nationalization of property was the root issue,
but conceivably not in Rich.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing discussion has attempted to chronicle the evolution of
the doctrine of sovereign immunity in the past one hundred and fifty years.
Its theoretical basis and structural limits were first set forth in The
Schooner Exchange. In the subsequent admiralty cases the scope of
application was decidedly expanded, but Marshall's rationale was employed
to justify the enlargement. The Navemar and Peru superimposed the concept of separation of powers and the correlative duty to accept an executive request for immunity. Then, in Hoffman, Mr. Justice Stone attempted to supplant the traditional basis by characterizing the doctrine
as an instrument of foreign affairs, and, therefore, within the exclusive
control of the executive. Whatever certainty and predictability that
existed under this case law was obfuscated by the issuance of the Tate
Letter in 1952. As indicated above, the Tate Letter can be read in at
least three different ways, and it is impossible to determine whether it represents a retreat from, or an affirmation of, Hoffman. If it is the latter,
the implementation of the Hoffman approach is exceedingly difficult because the executive has not delineated the substantive criteria of its
policy and apparently departs from the restrictive theory when political
considerations are found to be controlling.
The fairest synthesis of the doctrine is found in section 72 of the
Restatement. When a suggestion is issued by the executive it must be
accepted by the judiciary. This preserves the constitutional principles of
The Navemar and Peru. Contrariwise, in the absence of a suggestion,
the courts act as factfinders and apply the substantive rule of sovereign
immunity as it has developed judicially. By omission, the Restatement
rejects the implications of Hoffman that the executive policy should control the substantive principles. It should be noted that the absolute
theory of immunity, as understood by the courts, includes the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity, and that, therefore, embarrassment to the
executive seems limited to those situations where the State Department,
pursuant to the restrictive theory, refuses to issue a suggestion and the
courts subsequently grant immunity. Moreover, it is difficult to understand how a nation experiences embarrassment by acknowledging the
integrity of the rule of law as applied by its courts.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss3/5
82. Id. at 360.
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Throughout this rather abstract discussion of the absolute and restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, the pragmatic interests of the
private party plaintiff have been given only passing consideration. Since
the absolute theory of sovereign immunity subsumes the restrictive and
grants to a foreign nation an even greater measure of protection, there
can be little diplomatic or political embarrassment to our government consequent to its application by our courts. Thus, any determination to recast
the doctrine of sovereign immunity will probably be based on considerations of fairness and justice to the private plaintiff.8 3 Those same pressures which impelled enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act and the
Tucker Act may force a more definitive articulation of a plaintiff's rights.
Two possible procedures might be utilized. Treaties may be entered into
which more precisely detail the rights of citizens of one contracting
party to sue the other nation state.8 4 Alternatively, a congressional enactment such as the Hickenlooper Amendment 85 might be employed to delineate the precise scope of the sovereign immunity doctrine in American
courts.
Daniel T. Murphy
83. See Cardozo, Sovereign Immunity: The Plaintiff Deserves a Day in Court,
67 HARV. L. Rev. 608 (1954).
84. Treaty of Commerce, Friendship and Navigation with the Republic of Ireland,
Jan. 21, 1950, art. 15 [1950] 1 U.S.T. 1859, T.I.A.S. No. 2155.
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78 Stat. 1009.
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